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Censoring sCienCe in sixteenth-Century italy: 
reCent (and not-so-reCent) researCh
neil tarrant
Imperial College
Questions regarding the extent of ecclesiastical censorship in sixteenth-century Italy 
and its impact on the practice of science have long attracted the attention of historians 
of science. For many years these questions have been hard to address. Perhaps the 
most important obstacle facing scholars has been severely restricted access to the 
Archives of the Congregation of the Doctrine of Faith (ACDF), which houses many 
of the extant records of the Roman Inquisition and Index. Until relatively recently, 
only a handful of scholars were granted access to a limited range of records. Con-
sequently, only a selection of documents, relating to a limited number of famous 
trials, were ever studied let alone published. Many of these obstacles were removed 
in 1998, when the papacy opened these archives.1 For the first time historians have 
been able to access the materials necessary to assess the ambition, scale, organisa-
tion and effectiveness of the censorship conducted by the Inquisition and Index. 
Seizing this opportunity, Ugo Baldini and Leen Spruit have co-ordinated a project 
that has combed the archives looking for documents relating to the censorship of 
modern science, from the foundation of the Roman Inquisition in 1543 to 1808. 
In 2009 they published the first in a projected series of volumes of documents.2 
The materials now made available would, they hoped, permit the creation of a new 
picture of these institutions, one that afforded far greater sensitivity to “the slow, 
but significant development of the criteria, the scientific culture and philosophical 
mentality of members and functionaries of the Congregations, and finally as to the 
effects of ecclesiastical censorship”.3
In seeking to address this last issue, the effects of censorship, Baldini and Spruit 
explicitly engaged with enduring and familiar arguments about the Church and its 
attitudes towards science. They observed that:
Until recently, most studies on the relationship between the Catholic Church 
and modern science and philosophy were characterised by a strong anti-clerical 
flavour. It had in fact been generally assumed that ignorant censors and a funda-
mentally negative attitude towards modern intellectual developments would have 
caused the decline of science and natural philosophy in the Italian and Iberian 
peninsulas with respect to Protestant Europe.4
Baldini and Spruit here pointed to the long-standing perception that the Catholic 
Church was hostile to not only science, but towards modern ideas more generally. One 
of the most important aspects of Baldini and Spruit’s work is providing the resources 
that will make it possible to question and re-evaluate many of these assumptions.
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Using the documents that they have located, Baldini and Spruit have begun the 
process of rethinking the Church’s impact on science. In the section of their Intro-
duction “The Effects of Ecclesiastical Censorship”, they suggested that the extent of 
ecclesiastical censorship was actually far less significant than many historians had 
supposed previously. Having reviewed the evidence from the sixteenth century, they 
could identify only three trials during which individuals were “examined for philo-
sophical and scientific views”.5 The picture concerning the censorship of books is, they 
noted, more complex. Baldini and Spruit’s investigations have provided documents 
relating to seventy-six authors of “scientific” works placed into one or more of the 
various classes of the Index.6 They suggest that since press-control only reached its 
peak between 1587 and 1596 “the major effects of ecclesiastical censorship regarding 
science and natural philosophy became tangible during the next century”. Focusing 
on the sixteenth century, they concluded that the direct effects of censorship — that 
is trials, prohibition and censurae — have “probably been overstated”.7 Although 
less easy to quantify, they suggested that the indirect effects of censorship — the 
fear of censure engendered within the intellectual community — almost certainly 
shaped “the intellectual milieu in which contemporary scientific and philosophical 
research developed”.8
In this manner Baldini and Spruit have used the new empirical evidence that they 
have found to offer a nuanced reappraisal of what they take to be the central claims of 
the extant historiography. While this is both a vital and highly productive undertaking, 
the origins of historiographical picture that they challenge so successfully are hard 
to establish. Indeed Baldini and Spruit do not cite any particular authors, articles or 
books that contain the ideas that they are seeking to refute. It is not, however, difficult 
to find historical accounts that argue that during the sixteenth century the Catholic 
Church made the Italian peninsula an increasingly hostile environment in which to 
practise science. Present in textbooks on early modern Italy, and numerous discus-
sions of the Catholic Church and science, this historiographical commonplace is also 
frequently used to provide a context for the later Galileo Affair.9 Yet although this 
belief is expressed relatively frequently in the literature, it is supported by surprisingly 
little empirical research. In fact prior to Baldini and Spruit few, if any, historians of 
science, whether Anglophone or Italian-speaking, have conducted any detailed work 
on the extent, effectiveness or consequences of ecclesiastical censorship of science 
in sixteenth-century Italy.
This situation represents an intriguing historical puzzle. If there are no empirical 
studies of the censorship of science in sixteenth-century Italy, where did the idea that 
the Church became opposed to science come from? There are of course accounts 
of conflict between the Catholic Church and science. Since the nineteenth century, 
historians have been studying the relationship between science and religion, and have 
discussed famous examples from early modern Italy. Yet while the likes of John Wil-
liam Draper and Andrew Dickson White certainly described the trials of Bruno and 
Galileo, they argued that these were historical instances that reflected a more-or-less 
permanent state of conflict between science and religion.10 The narrative  underlying 
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the histories with which we are concerned is quite different. It does not suggest 
that there is an essential antagonism between science and religion, but that in late 
sixteenth-century Italy there occurred a significant and unprecedented deterioration 
in their relationship. One possible means to locate the source of this particular idea 
is to study alternative historiographical traditions. For much of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries the history of seventeenth-century Italy has been conceived as 
one of both economic and cultural decline. This idea was formed within a particular 
Italian intellectual history tradition, which I term the “Italian liberal historiographical 
tradition”. Consisting of several generations of politically engaged historians and 
philosophers, the authors of this tradition sought to provide an idealist interpretation 
of Italian history, and to explain the, at times fitful, progress of their nation towards 
modernity. To achieve these ends they produced highly influential accounts of Italy’s 
philosophical and intellectual culture, and its decline during the seventeenth century. 
Within these histories, ecclesiastical censorship of philosophy was ascribed a 
pivotal role. According to the authors of the liberal tradition, a new regime of eccle-
siastical censorship was constructed during the sixteenth century that caused the 
decay of the nation’s philosophical culture. This development in turn delayed Italy’s 
progress towards being a modern unified state. The advent of this new regime of 
censorship could, they argued, be explained as a consequence of the direction taken 
by the Church during the era of the Counter-Reformation. I argue that historians of 
science, both Italian and Anglophone have borrowed many of their key assumptions 
about the prevailing intellectual climate of the late cinquecento from the historians of 
the liberal tradition. Transposing these ideas in to their analyses of science, they have 
argued that during the sixteenth century the Counter-Reformation Church introduced 
a novel regime of censorship with devastating consequences. If we want to revise 
and rethink our histories of science we must examine these arguments, and consider 
whether they continue to stand up to scrutiny.
Over the last fifty years the history of Italy has been extensively revised. The 
decline of Italy’s culture posited by the historians of the liberal tradition has been 
widely challenged.11 Historians of science have shown that reports of the ‘death’ of 
Italian science have been greatly exaggerated.12 Others have clearly shown that the 
Catholic Church, or at least some of its constituent parts, was a leading sponsor of 
‘science’ throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.13 There are also several 
decades of research, which has revised older perceptions of the Counter-Reformation 
Church and its organs of censorship. Yet in spite of these studies, the idea that the 
Church became hostile to science still lingers. In part this reflects the fact that these 
various historiographical positions have yet to be integrated into a new synthesis of 
the censorship of Italian science. Drawing on these studies, I will begin to sketch an 
alternative model for conceptualising the Church and its programme of censorship 
in the sixteenth century. Finally, I will draw upon relatively recent innovations in 
the history of science to discuss Baldini and Spruit’s stated aim to investigate the 
Church’s attitude towards modern science in the early modern period. This discus-
sion will make it possible to reflect on how the material found by Baldini and Spruit 
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and their team, and information that may subsequently be brought to light, might 
be interpreted.
THE ITALIAN LIBERAL HISTORIOGRAPHICAL TRADITION
The genealogy of the Italian liberal historiographical tradition can be traced back 
at least as far as the 1840s, to the intellectual and political ferment that directly pre-
ceded the Risorgimento. By this time, numerous Italians had grown dissatisfied with 
the condition of their patria, which was divided into a patchwork of political units 
and conspicuously un-modernized. These apparent shortcomings were thrown into 
clear relief when the condition of the Italian peninsula was compared to Northern 
Europe, where powerful, unified, modern states such as Britain and France had been 
established.14 Across Italy both individuals and groups of like-minded thinkers and 
activists began to articulate a new vision of a future Italian nation. We are concerned 
here with the work of one circle of Neapolitan scholars centred on the brothers 
Silvio and Bertrando Spaventa. This group played a key role in the introduction of 
post-Enlightenment philosophy of Northern Europe into Italy. In 1844 the Spaventa 
brothers founded a philosophical journal, and two years later a school for instructing 
youth in philosophy. With their followers they began to develop a coherent and com-
pelling account of Italy’s intellectual history that aimed also to explain the political 
development of their homeland. The members of this circle were particularly drawn 
to the writings of G. W. F Hegel. His work seemed to offer a model of analysis that 
could furnish both an explanation for the dilapidated state of contemporary Italy, 
and a basis to outline a programme for effecting change.15
For Hegel, history progressed towards a predetermined end: Spirit’s self-awareness 
of freedom. Reason was the force driving history towards this telos. Acting through its 
human agents, it not only developed Spirit’s self-consciousness, but also encouraged 
the gradual reshaping of Man’s political and social environment. According to Hegel, 
these developments could be charted through various stages of human history. Christi-
anity played a central role in this scheme, for its advent first allowed Man to recognize 
his spiritual nature. Yet as the faith became institutionalised, reason was fettered by 
a medieval Church that demanded unquestioning obedience. These restraints were 
first loosened during the Renaissance, and then finally cast off during the Protestant 
Reformation. With reason freed once more, Spirit’s journey of self-discovery could 
resume. Northern Europe progressed through the Age of Enlightenment, a movement 
that promised to create modern political institutions, and societies structured along 
rational lines. It would also produce the philosophical sophistication necessary for 
Hegel to recognize and account for these processes in history.16
Whilst the Neapolitan Hegelians accepted the main thrust of Hegel’s account of 
history, they downplayed the relative importance of the Reformation and instead 
made the Italian Renaissance the fulcrum of European history. If Northern Europe 
had become modern, it had done so, they implied, by building directly upon the 
intellectual achievements of Italians. The Neapolitan Hegelians had executed an 
audacious reconceptualization of history and placed the philosophical traditions of 
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their nation at the heart of a new narrative of the rise of modern Europe. Their bold 
re-evaluation of Italy’s role in European history threw up a curious paradox: Italy, the 
well-spring of modernity, remained resolutely un-modernized. The journey of Spirit 
appeared to have stalled in Italy, preventing the nation’s progress towards modernity 
and unity. The question left hanging was: ‘Why?’17
In their effort to answer these questions certain of the Neapolitan Hegelians, notably 
Stanislao Gatti, pointed to the influence of the Church. Gatti’s ideas, subsequently 
developed further by Silvio and Bertrando Spaventa, and later Francesco de Sanctis, 
brought the issue of censorship to the fore in accounts of Italian philosophy. Reason, 
he argued, was indeed freed by the thinkers of the Renaissance, and it continued to 
be developed in the work of various philosophers throughout the sixteenth century. 
Yet whilst the cinquecento witnessed the assertion of ever more developed ideas, 
philosophy had never faced greater dangers. Beset by the deleterious effect of foreign 
occupation of the peninsula and the stultifying influence of the Church’s reaction to 
Protestantism, Italian intellectual life began to atrophy. Subsequently, it was all but 
destroyed by the machinery of Catholic censorship: the Inquisition and the Index. 
From the 1590s the heirs of the Renaissance, philosophers such as Giordano Bruno, 
Tommaso Campanella, and Galileo Galilei were reduced to silence by the Tribunal 
of the Holy Office. As a result of this cataclysmic series of trials and condemnations, 
Italy was no longer an environment conducive for Spirit to accomplish its aims. 
Cultural life withered, and with it the latent promise of the Renaissance.18
Although the climate for philosophy was bleak within Italy, Gatti argued, the system 
of thought born in that nation re-emerged in Northern Europe. Here in this more 
hospitable climate, it was free to fulfill its potential. Meanwhile, with the exception 
of the work of isolated individuals such as Giambattista Vico, Italy would remain 
culturally and intellectually barren. Only in the nineteenth century, when individuals 
such as the Spaventa brothers began to study the philosophy of Northern Europe, 
would the nation’s intellectual culture be re-born. For Gatti this meant that the Ital-
ians once “masters have now been forced to become disciples”. Betrando Spaventa, 
accepted the basic outline of Gatti’s account, but gave it a more positive accent. Since 
all of the ideas of the Enlightenment were ultimately of Italian origin, he argued, by 
studying and teaching them Italians were in fact connecting with their patrimony. For 
Spaventa, his efforts therefore represented not the importation of foreign philosophy 
but the completion of a “circulation of ideas”. Spaventa’s use of history was partly 
defensive: it justified his activities to contemporaries, which for some represented 
an unwelcome incursion of foreign philosophy. It was also programmatic: with the 
circulation of ideas now finished, the Spaventas and their followers believed that 
they could re-start the development of Spirit in their nation. Through practising and 
teaching philosophy they too could create a modern unified nation state.19
This narrative of Italy’s stalled progress to modernity has passed through vari-
ous iterations over the subsequent years, notably in the work of individuals such as 
Benedetto Croce, Giovanni Gentile, Delio Cantimori and Luigi Firpo. Echoing the 
Spaventas and their followers they each argued that, following the glories of the 
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Renaissance, Italy entered a protracted period of cultural, political and intellectual 
decadence. Like their predecessors, they blamed the Church for Italy’s plight. In 
contrast to the earlier accounts, these later members of the liberal tradition began 
to invoke the term Controriforma, to characterize the Church in this period. It must 
be noted however, that these various historians emphasized different facets of this 
movement.
The first main perspective, assumed by amongst others Croce and Cantimori, was 
formulated in relation to the idea that Italy had in fact inaugurated its own “failed 
Reformation”. They suggested that various Italian thinkers such as Bernardino Ochino 
tried in vain to advance an alternative vision of ecclesiastical reform. Distinctively 
Italian, this movement drew deeply upon the ideas of the Renaissance, and especially 
the work of Marsilio Ficino and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. For Croce, this Italian 
Reformation was the true origin of not only the Enlightenment, but ultimately also the 
Risorgimento. The potential of this Reformation was not realised immediately within 
Italy, for by the end of the sixteenth century it was overwhelmed by a rival vision of 
Catholicism forcefully articulated during the Council of Trent. Nevertheless, Ochino 
and other like-minded thinkers chose a life of exile, taking not only their ideas, but 
also the legacy of the Renaissance with them. The history of this Italian intellectual 
diaspora was later traced in greater detail by Cantimori. Yet for Croce in particular, 
the humanist reform programme was destroyed only indirectly by the Church of the 
Controriforma. Of greater significance, he argued, was a failure of confidence within 
the minds of the Reformers themselves.20 
The second interpretation of the Controriforma, can be found in the work of Luigi 
Firpo. He portrayed it as a movement formed in reaction to the external threat of 
Protestantism, and suggested that its nature and effects were made evident through its 
censorship of intellectual culture. His work includes studies of the trials of, amongst 
others, Bruno, Pucci and Campanella.21 According to Firpo, from the 1560s the 
attitude of the Church as a whole became “implacably severe” towards all forms of 
supposedly heterodox behaviour. This was because, following a successful campaign 
to exclude Protestantism from Italy:
The Church came out of [the struggle] with renewed vigour; and it could now 
adopt an attitude of intransigence that was a consequence, not an instrument of 
its success. It continued to keep its eye on theologians, as it did in the case of 
Baius and Carranza. But it now extended its vigilance to all manifestations of 
social and spiritual life — not only to religion, but also to ethics, to politics, to 
philosophy to art, and even to the manners and customs of the people.
Buoyed by its successful campaign against Protestantism, the Church extended its 
surveillance into hitherto unimagined fields, and it did so with an unprecedented sever-
ity. The impact of this extension was “well known”: “Religion, first of all, degenerated 
into artificial devotional practices often tainted with an unctuous hypocrisy. Morality, 
secondly withered into exterior show and cavilling casuistry.” This was the moment 
at which philosophy “entered its most dramatic moment”.22 Firpo continued that:
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Free Philosophical speculation in Italy fought its decisive battle during the 
pontificate of Clement VIII, in the last decade of the [sixteenth] century. It suf-
fered the condemnation of Patrizi’s Nova philosophia, of Telesio’s De rerum 
natura, and of all the works of Bruno and Campanella. It was crippled by the 
investigations opened against Giambattista Della Porta, Col Antonio Stigliola, 
and Cesare Cremonini, by the beginning of Campanella’s long imprisonment, 
by the execution of Francesco Pucci, and by the burning of Bruno. And finally, 
it was completely destroyed, in spite of the heroism of its martyrs. Its last, post-
humous act was played out thirty years later, in the silence of Arcetri [the villa 
in which Galileo was imprisoned after the conclusion of his trial in 1633, until 
his death in 1642].23 
For Firpo, the trials of the 1590s and their epilogue, the Galileo Affair, marked the 
end of all free philosophical speculation in Italy. As a consequence of these trials the 
motor of progress had been shut down, and Italy was condemned to enter a protracted 
period of decadence.24 Despite subtle differences of interpretation, the members of 
the liberal tradition did establish a clear grand narrative tracing Italy’s journey from 
the freedom and achievements of the Renaissance, to a period of decadence created 
by the unwarranted interference of the Church.
As I noted in the introduction to this article, there are in fact no detailed secondary 
accounts of the censorship of science in sixteenth-century Italy. Several historians 
of science have nevertheless discussed, albeit briefly, the situation facing individu-
als engaged in the production of science at this time. Their accounts are in many 
respects strikingly similar to those offered by the authors of the Italian liberal tradition. 
First, the key evidence used to discuss censorship and its effects in both traditions 
is essentially the same. The authors of the liberal tradition established a list of trials 
and condemnations, dating to the latter quarter of the sixteenth century. This list 
was clearly articulated, indeed made canonic, by Firpo in the passage cited above. 
It includes the processes opened against such (now) famous philosophers as Bruno 
and Campanella, lesser known figures such as Francesco Pucci and Col Antonio 
Stegliola, and the expurgation and, in some case, de facto suppression of works by 
authors such as Bernardino Telesio, and Francesco Patrizi. When historians of sci-
ence discuss the censorship of science in Italy, invariably they invoke some or all of 
these names. It could be argued that this indicates nothing more than the fact that an 
individual such as Patrizi is significant to both intellectual historians and historians 
of science. While this may well be true, there are further indications of borrowings 
from the liberal tradition.25
The liberal grand narrative suggested that prior to the middle of the cinquecento 
there existed relative intellectual freedom, but that it was all but destroyed by the 
later trials and condemnations. These events are therefore taken to be the key piece 
of evidence that indicates a major shift in the Church’s attitudes towards philosophy. 
Historians of science likewise seem to agree that at this time the Church radically 
altered the climate in which intellectuals were working, with severely limiting, if 
not downright detrimental, consequences for the production of scientific knowledge. 
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Remarkably, some historians of science have presented versions of this general claim 
as an established fact, without citing any primary or secondary evidence.26 When 
historians of science have provided evidence for this proposition, it has frequently 
consisted of an unacknowledged recitation of the canon of trials and condemnations 
identified by the authors of the Italian liberal tradition.27 On rare occasions historians 
of science have explicitly acknowledged this latter tradition. In his description of 
Italy’s intellectual atmosphere in the period immediately preceding the Galileo Affair, 
William Shea drew heavily upon, and specifically cited Firpo’s studies of these trials 
and condemnations.28
Finally, both historians of science and the authors of the liberal tradition share 
a common concept of the Counter-Reformation Church. This category is of course 
not unique to the Italian liberal historiography. It has multiple associations, but it is 
important to stress that it is not a neutral descriptor of a period in ecclesiastical history. 
As the work of Firpo cited above suggested, it signifies a Church that was reacting to, 
and that was fundamentally transformed by, its encounter with Protestantism. It also 
had a clear heuristic function for the authors of the liberal tradition. In their hands 
this term could be used to explain why the Church launched an assault on intellectual 
culture. Forced onto the defensive, it made a series of intellectual, theological and 
institutional innovations, which in turn unleashed a host of unintended consequences. 
The Church’s actions are thus portrayed as historically contingent deviations from 
the course that it might otherwise have pursued. Historians of science have also 
made use of essentially the same idea of a Counter-Reformation to fulfil precisely 
the same function in their narratives: to explain why the Church launched a hitherto 
unprecedented assault on scientific investigation.29
Whilst the narrative established by the authors of the liberal tradition appears to 
have influenced the accounts of historians of science, it provides an unsatisfactory 
basis for making claims about the history of science for two reasons. First, while the 
key premise of this account, that the trials of the late sixteenth century were indica-
tive of a watershed in the Church’s attitudes to intellectual culture, is at face value 
compelling, it can be called into question. The canon of trials and condemnations 
identified by the authors of the liberal tradition may indicate that the Inquisition and 
Index were indeed investigating philosophy and philosophers at this time. It does 
not, however, provide categorical proof that the Church’s desire — or indeed abil-
ity — to regulate and control philosophy was either new or increasing. I do not wish 
to argue here that any of these possibilities are necessarily untrue; just that they are 
as yet unproven. Settling these questions would require a detailed comparison of 
the levels of censorship across the century as a whole. Secondly, it is important to 
stress that the authors of the liberal tradition did not extend their analyses to science. 
Whilst they were trenchant in their criticisms of the Church’s impact on fields of 
cultural endeavour such as philosophy, art or literature, they were at best equivocal 
about the effect of ecclesiastical censorship on physical science. Indeed Croce and 
Firpo actually argued that the cultural legacy of the Renaissance assaulted in so 
many spheres was in fact preserved in the physical sciences. Nevertheless historians 
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of science have all too often interpreted the same cluster of trials as the proximate 
cause of Italian science’s ruination.30
THE REFORMATION AND THE COUNTER REFORMATION
The idea of a Counter-Reformation was first developed in the late eighteenth cen-
tury by the Göttingen jurist Johann Stephan Pütter as a concept in legal history. It 
was later used by Protestant historians such as Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886) to 
describe the Catholic Church’s efforts to combat the spread of Protestantism. As we 
have seen, this category has also played a central role in the work of Italian liberal 
historians and philosophers such as Croce and Firpo. Although it has been used by 
many historians of science there are compelling reasons to reject its continued use. 
In the work of a historian such as Firpo the Counter-Reformation Church is depicted 
as a monolith whose actions are to be interpreted solely as a response to those of the 
Protestants. On the one hand it appears as an institution solely driven by a desire to 
respond to external events rather than one that was also pursuing its own positive 
agenda. On the other, many of the Church’s actions in this period can be represented 
as novelties produced in response to the crisis precipitated by Luther’s protest. This 
perspective has in turn caused historians to efface important continuities between 
earlier reforming programmes and those of the sixteenth century. It also remains 
embedded in accounts of ecclesiastical censorship, which have often characterized 
the work of the Inquisition and Index as being purely a product of the Church’s 
reaction to Protestantism. In turn this has militated against any attempts to identify, 
let alone explain any long-term theological and philosophical motivations that may 
have driven the censorial agenda of its members.31
As early as 1870, German Catholic scholars rejected the reactionary and passive 
connotations of the label Counter Reformation and proposed in its stead alterna-
tives such as ‘Catholic Reformation’, ‘Catholic Reform’ or ‘Catholic Restoration’. 
The new labels reflected these historians’ belief that the developments within the 
Church were no mere reaction to the Protestant challenge, but were instead the 
result of a long process of internal reform. These early critiques displaced neither 
the label Counter Reformation, nor the perception that in countries where it was the 
dominant faith Catholicism had hindered the advent of modernity. Over a century 
later, the German historian Wolfgang Reinhard directly tackled both of these issues 
in a significant article “‘Gegenreformation als Modernisierung?’ Prolegomena zu 
einer Theorie des konfessionellen Zeitalters”, in which he explicitly rejected the 
earlier distinction between a supposedly progressive Reformation and a reactionary 
Counter Reformation. Seeking to re-conceptualize the Catholic Church’s contribution 
to the development of modernity, he emphasised its similarities with the Protestant 
Church, developing the theory of confession building or “confessionalisation”. This 
concept suggests that Churches on both sides of the confessional divide were trying 
to draw the people of Europe onto a disciplinary grid, using similar techniques of 
encouragement and coercion. Debate continues today over the correct label to apply 
to the Catholic Church in this period, and some historians retain the use of the label 
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Counter Reformation while being sensitive to its potential drawbacks. In order to 
avoid the term’s limitations, it may simply be easier to stop using it all together. 
John William O’Malley has suggested that the label which perhaps best captures the 
full complexity of this period is the relatively neutral ‘early modern Catholicism’.32
These historiographical developments have been paralleled by relatively recent 
research into the debates within the early modern Italian Church. Although Italian 
historians have tended to retain the label Controriforma, they have created a picture 
of Italy’s religious history during the sixteenth century that is far more subtle and 
complex than that which we previously possessed. In producing this work many 
modern scholars have taken their cue from the work of historians such as Cantimori. 
Pursuing the latter’s belief that Italy had begun its own ‘failed’ reformation, these 
historians have focused their work on the suppression of reformist movements within 
the Church. They have also shown that by drawing inspiration from humanists such 
as Desiderius Erasmus — who was himself influenced by Ficino — these reformers 
demanded that greater freedom and responsibility should be given to the individual 
to play a role in their spiritual life. The reformers believed that this could be achieved 
by such radical methods as educating every person so that they could read Scripture 
for themselves in the vernacular. From the 1520s onwards some thinkers combined 
the ideas produced by indigenous reform movements with the teachings of Luther 
and other Northern Reformers. Known as the spirituali this group of leading Catholic 
clerics and laymen, such as Gasparo Contarini and Cardinal Morone, attempted in 
the years leading up to the 1540s to re-calibrate the relationship between works and 
faith within the Catholic Church.33
Further research has shown that these views were vigorously contested by another 
group of reformers within the Church, whom historians have often dubbed intran-
sigenti or zelanti. Led by powerful clerics such as Gian Pietro Carafa (later Pope 
Paul IV), its members believed that the clergy should offer instruction in the tenets 
of the faith necessary for salvation, whilst restricting access to the sacred texts. In 
an important series of works Massimo Firpo (Luigi Firpo’s son) and Dario Marcatto 
have shown that the zelanti used the Inquisition as a power base from which to eradi-
cate the views of their opponents, and to impose their vision of Catholicism within 
society. This involved the active suppression of not only the ideas of the spirituali, 
but also those of the humanists. By building upon the earlier liberal tradition, Firpo 
and Marcatto have offered a highly sophisticated account of the Catholic Church, 
which highlights the existence of an intense struggle within the Church to define 
the parameters of orthodoxy. In turn these new historiographical perspectives offer 
the chance to tell a far more complex story about the history of censorship, by sug-
gesting that the views expressed through the Inquisition’s actions were not those of 
a monolithic ‘Church’, but those of a ‘party’ within its structure. It has also shown 
that the Church was not solely concerned with facing the ‘external’ challenge of 
Protestantism, but that it was also engaged in a bitterly-fought internal conflict. At 
stake was the ‘true’ definition of the Catholic faith.34
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 THE INQUISITION AND THE INDEx OF FORBIDDEN BOOKS  
Although the Inquisition and Index of Forbidden Books are known to most historians 
of science, few have engaged seriously with the historiography of these institutions. 
This observation would be unremarkable, were it not for the fact that the Inquisition 
played a pivotal role in one of the most notorious events in the history of science: 
the trial of Galileo Galilei. Historians working on this, the most famous inquisito-
rial trial of a philosopher, have remained largely unconcerned by the nature and 
operations of this institution. This situation is rendered all the more extraordinary 
by the existence of a formidable bibliography, which provides detailed accounts of 
the institutional history of both the Inquisition and the Index; accounts of how the 
Inquisition functioned as a judicial tribunal; assessments of the impact of Inquisito-
rial prosecutions and the imposition of the Index on a vast array of groups within 
society including heretics, witches, and Jews. Although it is fair to concede that not 
all of this literature is germane to the Galileo Affair, it is remarkable that this vast 
resource of secondary literature has not been previously tapped by any but a handful 
of historians of science.35
The Roman Inquisition was established in 1543, largely in response to the threat 
posed by Protestant heresy. Some, but by no means all, historians of science have 
acknowledged that it was a reorganized version of a pre-existing institution. Yet of 
those who have noted that the Inquisition has a longer history, few have worked 
through the implications of this fact. The Inquisition was originally established in 
1184 as an episcopal institution, and it was intended to be used primarily for root-
ing out the Cathar heresy. By the 1230s it had been re-established as a tool of papal 
power, and it was staffed predominantly by members of the two most important 
orders of mendicant friars: the Franciscans and the Dominicans. The Papal Inquisi-
tion was in continuous existence between its establishment in the thirteenth century 
and its re-founding in the middle of the sixteenth, and it played a significant part in 
defining orthodoxy within Italian society during these years. To complete this task, 
inquisitors gradually developed a series of procedures and precedents for locating, 
identifying and dealing with heresies. These earlier ideas and practices, recorded in 
sources such as inquisitor’s guidebooks, helped to form the basis of the Inquisition’s 
response to suspected heretics and their beliefs and practices in the sixteenth century. 
To understand the Inquisition’s actions in this later period, we must therefore also 
investigate its actions over the preceding 350 years.36
Attention must also be paid to the specific manner in which the Roman Inquisition 
and Index operated in the sixteenth century. Over the last forty years our understand-
ing of these matters has been greatly enhanced by investigations into the manner in 
which they functioned as institutions. These studies were pioneered in the 1970s by 
John Tedeschi, who established many of the Inquisition’s procedures, and offered a 
detailed account of how the network of inquisitorial courts functioned within Italian 
society.37 Studies of the Inquisition were later taken in a new direction by the work 
of Paul Grendler, who began to study its role in the censorship of books. Consciously 
building on the writings of earlier historians such as L. Firpo and Tedeschi, Grendler 
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not only set out to reconstruct the mechanisms of censorship in one city, Venice, but 
also to evaluate its effectiveness. To this end, he set out to assess the extent to which 
decrees of the Inquisition, and the various Indices were enforced, and the impact that 
they had upon the book trade.38
This body of work on the Inquisition has been complemented by renewed interest in 
the history of censorship. Historians including Vittorio Frajese and Gigliola Fragnito 
have drawn a sophisticated picture of the structures of book censorship, and provided 
detailed accounts of the production of the various Indices of Forbidden Books. They 
have also shown that the Inquisition’s power over censorship was contested during 
the sixteenth century. Drawing on the insights of M. Firpo and Marcatto, Fragnito 
and Frajese have shown that during the latter half of the cinquecento the episcopate 
and the Inquisition were engaged in a protracted struggle for influence. At stake was 
not only the question of who should carry out the work of censorship, but also who 
should establish the criteria by which censors should operate. Fragnito and Frajese’s 
work has shown that, in contrast to the Inquisition, many bishops were sympathetic 
to humanist ideas, such as expanding the circulation of vernacular Bibles, and that 
many advocated a relatively tolerant attitude towards the Talmud. They wished to 
construct and implement a censorial regime that embodied these values and beliefs. 
Their position was bolstered in the 1570s when cardinals broadly sympathetic to the 
aims of the bishops took control of the newly established Congregation for the Index. 
The scene was set for a bitter contest. By the end of the cinquecento the Inquisition 
had seized control of the whole machinery of censorship, and it used its powers of 
investigation and censorship to crush the humanist reforming movements.39
The implications that these important insights hold for the history of science have 
yet to be fully explored. The historians whom I have discussed above have tended 
not to research the censorship of philosophy or science. While some historians have 
made use of these insights in order to begin to rethink the history of ecclesiastical 
censorship of science and/or philosophy, they have not applied them to the late 
sixteenth century in a comprehensive or systematic manner.40 If such a project were 
undertaken, it would significantly transform our understanding of these issues. Above 
all, historians such as Fragnito and Frajese have shown that for much of the sixteenth 
century there was no single centralized censorial authority. On the contrary there were 
multiple competing authorities, which frequently vied with one another to exercise 
censorial power. Consequently, a philosopher’s work could be assessed by one of a 
variety of authorities, each potentially working to differing, and possibly contradic-
tory, standards of orthodoxy. Given these circumstances it is perhaps unsurprising 
that philosophers sometimes found themselves on the wrong side of the boundaries 
of legitimate expression. These observations suggest that we should conceptualize 
the history of censorship as fluid and dynamic, and not simply static and hostile. An 
essential first step in writing such a history will be recovering the censorial ambi-
tions of each of these various authorities and tracing how they developed over the 
course of the century.
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THE MECHANICS OF CENSORSHIP: THE WORK OF FRANCESCO BERETTA
Francesco Beretta has begun to establish the methodological tools necessary for the 
reconstruction of the various censorial agendas utilised in sixteenth-century Italy. 
Building upon the earlier studies of the institutional history of the Inquisition under-
taken by historians such as Tedeschi, Beretta has sought to establish the procedures 
that the Inquisition adopted in order to determine whether an individual who had 
expressed a philosophical opinion could be convicted of heresy.41 He has shown 
that once a person had fallen under suspicion of heresy and had become engaged in 
the Inquisitorial machinery, the Tribunal of the Holy Office’s first task was to deter-
mine whether there was in fact a case to be answered. Consequently, the first stage 
of any investigation was to determine whether any of the propositions tendered by 
the accused were effectively heretical. This task fell to the theologian qualificators 
of the Tribunal who were required to pronounce upon the theological status of the 
proposition in question. This judgement was crucial because the decision to take a 
trial forward was made at this stage, for Inquisitorial legislation and the punishments 
for heresy were only applicable if the assertions of the defendant contradicted the 
faith in a direct or indirect manner. If the defendant’s propositions were a matter of 
theological debate, or if they only contradicted common doctrine but not the faith, the 
penalties reserved for heretics were not applicable. Failure to meet these requirements 
meant that the accused could not be forced to abjure nor could they be subject to any 
physical punishment. In cases in which it was established that a suspect had indeed 
expressed opinions that were formally contrary to the faith, it was then necessary 
to establish whether the accused believed them to be true. In order for a suspect to 
be judged to be guilty of a crime of formal heresy the Tribunal needed to be certain 
that the accused persisted in maintaining the truth of their error, even after its falsity 
had been made clear to them.42
Once these stages of assessment had been fulfilled, the findings were drawn together 
in official form by the Notary of the Tribunal in the Incartamento processuale. This 
information was then summarised in a single document called the summarium, the 
function of which Beretta explained “was to set out all of the judicial and doctrinal 
elements of the case in a succinct but precise manner, before the court”. This docu-
ment was then sent to the actual court of the Holy Office, which would judge the 
accused. The summary was especially important since the court of the Tribunal of 
the Holy Office, composed of the pope and the Cardinals of the Inquisition, did not 
participate directly in the interrogation of the accused. Instead they pronounced on 
the case on the basis of the information that they received in the summary. The sum-
mary was also distributed to the legal and theological consultors of the Inquisition 
so that they could offer their opinion to the court.43
Beretta has subsequently demonstrated how these insights can be used to better 
understand how the Inquisition investigated philosophy. As he has shown, the staff of 
Inquisition, specifically the theologian qualificators, played a crucial role in determin-
ing whether or not a philosophical idea should be considered formally heretical. This 
draws specific attention to the manner in which these particular individuals within the 
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Inquisition understood the relationship between philosophy and the Catholic faith, 
and hence how they determined the orthodoxy of a given philosophical idea. These 
standards were central to the Inquisition’s work, for heterodoxy, and therefore heresy, 
is always defined in relation to a particular standard of orthodoxy.44 Orthodoxy is not 
a historical constant; ideas of what constituted the ‘true’ faith have changed over time, 
and have been subject to dispute in every historical period. As Beretta has observed it 
is necessary “to understand orthodoxy as a process, as a product that is always plural 
and permanently evolving in the face of clashes between representatives of different 
conceptions of orthodoxy”. The fact that standards of orthodoxy were neither fixed, 
nor universally recognised within the Church, but constantly subject to negotiation, 
conflict and change, makes it necessary to establish precisely which institution was 
conducting any given act of censorship. He concluded that in order to understand 
an event such as the Galileo Affair it was necessary to reconstruct precisely which 
standard of orthodoxy was being used within the Inquisition, rather than talking about 
orthodoxy within the Church as a whole.45
Pursuing this line of argument, Beretta emphasized the fact that the Inquisition was 
primarily staffed by members of the mendicant orders, and especially by Dominican 
and Franciscan friars. From the thirteenth century onwards, these orders of friars had 
developed distinctive approaches to philosophy, which they imported into the Inquisi-
tion. Beretta has defined their approach to philosophy as the ‘scholastic orthodoxy’, 
which was developed by several prominent friars, most notably Thomas Aquinas, 
during the high scholastic era at the end of the thirteenth and beginning of the four-
teenth century. They developed a series of principles governing the relations between 
philosophy and theology, which Beretta defines as the ‘scholastic criteriology’, in 
order to address the challenges that had grown up in the wake of the re-discovery 
of Aristotle’s philosophy. Above all, these principles were used to confront the 
specific threat posed by a form of secular Aristotelianism that first flourished in the 
University of Paris during the thirteenth century, which seemed to threaten to make 
the philosophical field autonomous.46
According to Beretta, although there were differences between the orders’ spe-
cific formulation of the ‘scholastic criteriology’, there was broad agreement on the 
key points of principle. Most importantly, the orders of friars shared a belief in the 
Augustinian idea that there was a unity of truth, which in turn implied that theology 
and philosophy could never reach contradictory conclusions. Aquinas developed this 
point within the new scholastic understanding of Aristotelian science, arguing that 
the science of theology possessed a higher level of certainty than that of philosophy. 
This was because theologians demonstrated their conclusions by reasoning about 
principles revealed directly by God, whereas philosophers reached their conclusions 
by reasoning about principles discovered by Man unaided. According to Aquinas, 
the higher level of certainty possessed by theology instantiated a hierarchy of disci-
plines. He then used this conclusion to argue that if a theologian and a philosopher 
reached differing conclusions, for instance with regard to the eternity of the world, 
then this implied the falsity of the philosopher’s arguments. Consequently, if any 
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such  disagreements should occur, then it was incumbent upon the philosopher to 
reconsider his arguments until he had reached a conclusion that was in accordance 
with that established in theology. For Beretta, this principle of the hierarchy of dis-
ciplines was expressed in the Parisian condemnations of the 1270s.47
Making use of these insights, Beretta has also begun to develop an alternative 
framework for considering the history of the censorship of philosophy in late six-
teenth and seventeenth century Italy. Since at least the late thirteenth century, the 
mendicant orders had been attempting to assert their vision of the correct relations 
between philosophy and theology on the Church and Christian society as a whole. 
In Italy their efforts had not met with success. Although secular Aristotelianism had 
been virtually eradicated from the universities of Northern Europe, it continued to 
flourish in the universities of Bologna and Padua. Perhaps most notoriously, the 
university masters openly discussed the philosophical arguments surrounding the 
mortality of the individual soul. The situation was further complicated during the 
course of the Renaissance, when certain individuals began to develop alternative 
styles of philosophy rooted in ancient authorities other than Aristotle.48
According to Beretta, the university masters were able to continue teaching and 
discussing philosophical ideas in this manner because the mendicants lacked the 
power to impose their scholastic orthodoxy within the universities of Italy. This was 
because earlier condemnations and decrees, for instance those issued in Paris in the 
1270s, had only local authority. The friars were therefore forced to find alternative 
means to control the teaching and publication of Italian university masters. From the 
middle of the fifteenth century, they began to take chairs in the faculty of arts and 
medicine of the Italian universities in an effort to influence the teaching and discussion 
of philosophy therein. The situation facing the mendicants changed at the beginning of 
the sixteenth century when the Fathers of the Fifth Lateran Council issued the decree 
Apostolici regiminis (1516). It declared that since truth could not contradict truth, 
philosophers should refrain from teaching as philosophically true any doctrine that 
contradicted the faith. Beretta observed that: “The novelty of the decree of Lateran V 
consists in the fact of having established in canon law the principles of the scholastic 
criteriology that justifies the hierarchy between philosophy and theology.” It was he 
added like “just like the statutes of the faculty of Arts of Paris, in 1272, but with a 
virtually universal range”. From this point forward, Beretta argued, the mendicants 
possessed the theoretical power to impose their conception of orthodoxy.49
In principle the mendicants could now seek to impose their concepts of philo-
sophical orthodoxy, but in practice they lacked the power to use it for much of the 
first half of the sixteenth century. Drawing upon the recent studies of the Church 
discussed above, Beretta suggested that this situation changed dramatically when, 
in response to the various reformist threats, the papacy re-founded the Inquisition. 
This development gave the mendicants virtually unprecedented powers, which they 
began to use not only to uproot Protestant heresies, but also to impose their vision of 
philosophical orthodoxy on the philosophers of the schools and on the independent 
humanist philosophers. This new combination of legal and institutional powers not 
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only allowed the mendicants to step up the pressure on secular Aristotelians such 
as Cesare Cremonini, but also ultimately paved the way for the prosecution of such 
famous trials as those of Bruno, and Galileo, and the condemnation of the work of 
Patrizi and Telesio.50
Beretta’s model of analysis certainly provides an excellent basis for interpreting 
ecclesiastical censorship in the sixteenth century, offering methods for reconstruct-
ing censorial agendas and linking them to the broader history of the Church. These 
insights can be expanded in two ways. As it stands Beretta’s model of analysis only 
applies to the censorship of philosophy. Whilst philosophy is an essential element of 
early modern science, the term ‘science’ embraces a far wider range of disciplines 
and arts, including astrology and alchemy. In order to talk about a history of the 
censorship of ‘science’ it will be essential to reconstruct the attitudes of the censors 
towards these arts and activities too.51 Secondly, Beretta’s work is overwhelmingly 
concerned with the Inquisition. If we are to offer a more complete picture of the 
various forms of ecclesiastical censorship operating during the sixteenth century, it 
will be necessary to reconstruct the standards of orthodoxy deployed, for instance, 
by episcopal censors, or by those who compiled and maintained the Index especially 
during periods when it was prepared independently of the Inquisition.
THE CHURCH AND MODERN SCIENCE
To conclude this article, I would like to return to discuss the collection of documents 
produced by Baldini and Spruit. The volume is clearly a work of remarkable scholar-
ship, and it will certainly be a tremendous resource for generations of historians to 
come. Although this work’s importance is beyond doubt, it is possible to criticize the 
analytical framework adopted to allow for the volume’s production. From the title it is 
clear that Baldini and Spruit’s intention is to ask the question: “What was the Church’s 
attitude towards modern science in the early modern period?” This is, perhaps, the 
wrong question to ask. I make this observation on two grounds. The first is the fact 
that during the sixteenth century the Church did not possess a single, formal position 
on ‘science’, modern or otherwise. On one level this observation is a simple corollary 
of my earlier emphasis on the plural nature of ecclesiastical censorship: these docu-
ments will cast much light on the Inquisition and Index’s censorial ambitions and 
practices, but this is not the same as establishing the Church’s attitudes as a whole.
There is however a deeper problem concerned with the aims and the purposes of 
ecclesiastical censorship that must be taken into account irrespective of the specific 
agency by which it was conducted. If, for sake of clarity and brevity, we focus 
solely on the Inquisition and the Index, it is arguable that prosecuting ‘science’ was 
not an end in itself for either of these institutions. Indeed, they were not founded to 
investigate any particular field of human endeavour, but to root out heresy however 
it manifested itself. Nevertheless, in their pursuit of heresy, the Inquisition and the 
Index formulated a series of responses to a range of ideas and practices relating in 
some manner to the understanding or manipulation of the natural world. Today we 
may, or may not, choose to classify some of these ideas and practices as ‘science’, but 
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it is by no means self-evident that either the Inquisition, the Church as an institution 
or even individual clerics considered them to constitute a single type of activity that 
was collectively amenable to ecclesiastical discipline. Acknowledging these points, I 
propose that we reformulate the question as follows: “Why at particular moments in 
history did ecclesiastical censors define as heretical, certain intellectual ideas, prac-
tices or philosophical teachings relating to the natural world?” Once we have answered 
this question, we can then ask: “Did the censors see any connections between these 
various domains of activity?” and if so “Do they conform in any meaningful sense 
to modern taxonomies of early modern activities, which we may label ‘science’?”
My second ground of objection is that it is exceptionally difficult to arrive at any 
satisfactory definition of ‘modern science’ that is applicable to the early modern 
period. Baldini and Spruit do acknowledge this issue, but they do not discuss it at 
length, on the grounds that “an edition of documents is not the ideal place to discuss 
general and complex issues concerning nature and the sciences”. To me this is a 
puzzling statement since settling on a definition of what counts as ‘modern science’ 
is an essential first step in the process of selecting documents for inclusion in such 
a volume. Nevertheless, they do give some space to these issues lest ignoring them 
entirely “might suggest a positivistic or anachronistic view of science”.52 Pointing to 
the difficulties of defining ‘science’ they note that using a contemporary concept of 
scientia would result in a definition at once too broad for their purposes, for it would 
include disciplines such as theology, but also too narrow as it would, for example, 
rule out Biblical commentaries on Genesis, and other areas of human activity such 
as magic, astrology or alchemy. They therefore decided to introduce a modern defi-
nition, albeit one that respected contemporary practices and ideas. Hence “a history 
of the relationship between the Catholic church and modern science should not only 
investigate authors and works that laid the groundwork for modern science, but also 
the variegated range of early modern issues and mentalities concerning nature and 
natural knowledge”. As a consequence they note that they have adopted “essentially 
pragmatic criteria [of selection], endorsing a broad view of science, and accordingly 
of scientific activity and works”. They then list fourteen general areas into which 
the various documents that they have discovered might fall. These include not only 
“Science in a ‘modern’ sense” which encompassed “topics which nowadays are 
viewed as part of some natural science” and “‘Pure’ and ‘mixed’ mathematics”, but 
also such activities as “Astrology” and “Natural magic”. 53
At face value such views seem totally unobjectionable. I agree that the various 
domains of activity that they include in their discussion are all essential in any study 
of early modern science. My criticisms fall less on the choice of materials than the 
rationale governing their selection, and the implications of such a rationale. Baldini 
and Spruit in effect argue that we must have an eye on two interconnected types of 
activity. The first is a broad range of contemporary disciplines, arts and practices that 
in some manner relate to the natural world. For the sake of clarity I will refer to this 
as ‘early modern science’. There is also another type of activity: modern science. It 
is evident that Baldini and Spruit view the relationship between these two spheres of 
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activity to be complex. They argue that modern science was not only present in early 
modern society in forms that are more or less recognisable to we moderns, but also 
that “in the sixteenth century many (directly and indirectly) scientific topics were 
investigated in works to which the qualification ‘scientific’ could not be attached 
according to the then generally accepted epistemological standards, and it would not 
be possible today either”. To take one example, Baldini and Spruit argue that docu-
ments relating to at least some forms of magic should be included in this volume. This 
was justified on the grounds that natural magic “did contain credulities, intentional 
illusions and false beliefs, but also more or less correct observations, useful intuitions 
or mechanical devices able to produce surprising or even ‘supernatural’ effects”. In 
other words, although much of magic is patently false, work of genuine scientific 
merit could dwell within it.54
While this perspective does allow for the inclusion of magic in a discussion of 
the history of science, it has a number of limitations. By assuming this position, 
the historian suggests that it is possible to identify in the complex of early modern 
intellectual culture certain activities that can be considered to be the progenitors of, 
or even to be, ‘modern science’ and to distinguish them from others that cannot. 
Although magic as a whole cannot be classified as science, parts of it could, from 
a modern perspective, be considered to be ‘scientific’, and so a historian of science 
can legitimately study these aspects of magic. It also follows from this position that 
magical arts should only be included in the discussion of early modern science, if 
they seem to conform in some manner to a modern conception of the ‘scientific’. 
This is, of course, a valid methodological position, but just one with which I happen 
not to agree. In the first instance it begs significant questions about the grounds on 
which we as historians of science select material for study. Assuming this position 
would, for example, restrict the historian of science to only considering cases of 
the Inquisition or the Index’s prosecution of magic when (s)he finds some elements 
within the activities being investigated that appear to him/her to coincide with 
modern definitions of science. If, however, magical ideas do not resemble modern 
science, or if they do not appear to include ‘scientific’ elements, then it follows that 
they can be excluded from consideration. They need not be included in a collection 
of documents, for example. Baldini and Spruit certainly exclude documents relating 
to ‘folk magic’ on precisely these grounds.55 I would suggest that this is an impor-
tant omission, for whilst some forms of folk magic may have lacked an intellectual 
underpinning, the inquisitor’s evaluation of these ideas and practices was rooted 
in philosophy and theology. Discounting these documents, would prevent us from 
examining the Inquisition’s intellectual and institutional responses to the full range 
of magical activities that its members encountered.
The problems caused by assuming this position are equally pressing on an 
analytical level. As we saw in the introduction, in their discussion “The effects of 
ecclesiastical censorship”, Baldini and Spruit argued that during the sixteenth century 
only three individuals were put on trial for practising science or philosophy. It is 
necessary to consider how they arrived at this conclusion. They observed that in the 
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extant archival holdings they were able to identify only twelve occasions when the 
Church conducted trials against “authors who are significantly related to science and 
natural philosophy”. Having examined the documents more closely, they were able 
to discount nine of these trials on the basis that: “In most cases, the defendant was 
accused of heresy (Protestantism or sympathy for the Protestants) of the possession of 
forbidden works or else for magic, the defence or practice of judiciary astrology and 
divination. Only in the trials of Borri, Bruno and Stigliola the Holy Office examined 
philosophical and scientific views.”56 
It is unobjectionable that an individual who happens to have written ‘scientific’ 
works, but was prosecuted for his Protestant beliefs, should not be included in an 
account of the censorship of science. The comments on magic appear to me more 
troubling. Baldini and Spruit’s position implies that if a scholar were prosecuted on 
the basis of the magical elements contained in his work then he cannot be considered 
to have been prosecuted for having practised science. As a consequence, this scholar 
need not be included in any reckoning of the Church’s impact on science. There are a 
number of ambiguities in this position. First there seems to be a tension between the 
idea that magic can be included in this collection of documents, but excluded from 
the analysis of the effects of censorship on modern science. If we accept that magic 
should be accepted as part of the field of early modern science, then it seems logical 
to accept that prosecutions for magic should also be included in our analysis of the 
effects of ecclesiastical censorship. The only explanation for Baldini and Spruit’s 
position is that they have cast a wide net, and included documents on a broadly con-
ceived field of early modern science, but have chosen only to analyse cases in which 
individuals were engaged in activities that either were modern science, or contained 
elements which to the modern eye appear scientific.
Such a conclusion points to a deeper problem inherent in Baldini and Spruit’s 
analysis. Their definition of modern science ultimately governs their determination 
of which trials or condemnations should be included in their study. Consequently, 
the object of their empirical enquiry, that is the extent of ecclesiastical censorship 
of modern science, is the product of a category that they have constructed. The most 
significant implication of this observation is the fact that if any adjustments were 
made to this definition of ‘modern science’, it would alter our perception of the extent 
to which it was affected by ecclesiastical censorship. This introduces a degree of 
instability into the analysis, for, even if we accept the principle of using the category 
‘modern science’ or even ‘science’ in the early modern period, it would be virtually 
impossible to define it in such a way as to command universal assent. Furthermore, 
using Baldini and Spruit’s particular notion of modern science may actually distort 
both our understanding of the impact of censorship on both early modern science, 
and the long-term development of modern scientific disciplines. This is because if we 
did adopt their methods for assessing whether a prosecution was genuinely directed 
against philosophy or science — that is one that excludes a priori prosecutions for 
magic — we would exclude much relevant material from our analysis. A brief dis-
cussion of the case of alchemy will explain why.
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It is clear from Baldini and Spruit’s taxonomy of early modern science, that they 
have an ambivalent attitude towards alchemy. In the category “Science in a ‘modern’ 
sense”, they include “chemistry (including both its ‘scientific’ forms and alchemy)”. 
Elsewhere they expand on this comment noting that: “from a modern point of view, 
alchemy can hardly be viewed as a science, as it displays a secret vocabulary and 
methodology, it lacks a clear cut conceptual framework, and it is largely based on 
arbitrary procedures.” Nevertheless, they note that alchemy should be included 
within the broad remit of their investigation as it was a repository of ancient practical 
knowledge, and provided the context from which modern, that is post-1650, chem-
istry would emerge. Recent research has called into question the validity of drawing 
such radical distinctions. Notably, the work of historians such as William Newman 
and Lawrence Principe has radically redrawn our understanding of alchemy and 
its relationship to chemistry. Debunking older accounts that presented this art as a 
spurious activity lacking in both theory and rigour, they have outlined its intellectual 
bases and demonstrated its technical precision. In so doing, they have underlined 
its importance as a contemporary field of intellectual and practical endeavour, and 
they have demonstrated that the terms ‘alchemy’ and ‘chemistry’ designated a single 
indistinguishable sphere of activity until the middle of the eighteenth century. There 
were, they suggested, fundamental continuities between alchemy/chemistry practised 
in the medieval and early modern periods.57
Whilst its reputation has been rehabilitated within the history of science, alchemy 
nevertheless raises important questions for any understanding of the censorship of 
early modern science, and indeed modern science. The theological grounds justifying 
ecclesiastical interventions into alchemy were often different to those justifying an 
intervention in the field of natural philosophy. For example, a natural philosopher 
who held the proposition that the individual soul was mortal to be true, was explicitly 
contradicting Catholic teachings on the soul. In this instance, the philosopher’s heresy 
lay in an explicit denial of doctrine. There was nothing inherently heretical about 
alchemy, but an individual practising this art might attract the Inquisition’s attention 
when his feats, real or claimed, were considered too wondrous to be achievable by 
mere human artifice. If his works were considered to be literally incredible, some 
might suspect him of having made a compact with a demon in order to achieve his 
ends. In this instance the alchemist was considered a heretic on account of his dia-
bolic apostasy, witting or otherwise, which was regarded to be necessary in order 
for him to secure a demon’s assistance. In this case was the Church investigating 
‘science’? As we have seen, alchemy is of fundamental importance to the history of 
chemistry. Was the Church investigating magic? Certainly. It is simply not possible 
to make clear-cut distinctions between science and magic in this period. If we were 
to exclude prosecutions for alchemy from our analysis on the grounds that they were 
rooted in the Church’s campaign against magic, we would be unable to consider how 
such prosecutions affected the practice of this art in the sixteenth century, or to assess 
their effects on the long-term development of modern chemistry.58
This leads me on to my final reason for objecting to Baldini and Spruit’s aim of 
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investigating the Church’s relationship with modern science. Baldini and Spruit have 
drawn attention to the polemical context in which the idea of a Church hostile to 
science was formed. Nevertheless, they continue to engage with the arguments put 
forward by the combatants of this debate. One of the key questions at stake in their 
work remains: “Did the Church hinder the emergence of modern science?” Baldini 
and Spruit’s project provides a wealth of empirical evidence that will enable a reas-
sessment of the various claims and counter-claims of the earlier antagonistic accounts, 
and their framework of analysis certainly makes it possible to engage directly with 
this question. Yet their focus on using these archives to assess the extent of the censor-
ship of modern science, has limited the potential of these resources to pose questions 
about the history of early modern science. This is because, as the case of alchemy 
has shown, introducing the idea of modern science leads us to ignore the issues at 
stake for contemporaries when discussing the legitimate boundaries of knowledge. 
In turn this means that it is far harder to pose questions about the Church’s motives 
for intervening in the range of disciplines, arts and practices that constituted early 
modern science, and the consequences of these interventions.
In order to pose fresh questions about the Church’s attitude towards science in 
the early modern period, we must adopt a historicist perspective that respects con-
temporary categories. One of the most significant turns in Anglophone history of 
science over the last thirty years has been to stress the methodological importance 
of respecting contemporary disciplinary boundaries. In practice this has led to exten-
sive emphasis on the use of the term ‘natural philosophy’ rather than ‘science’ when 
discussing knowledge making in the early modern period. This effort should not 
be limited to swapping the term ‘science’ for ‘natural philosophy’. In the words of 
Andrew Cunningham, it is also necessary to “take natural philosophy seriously”. It is 
incumbent upon the historian to seek to understand what this activity was, why it was 
created and the reasons why, and the methods by which, it was circumscribed within 
early modern culture. This drive to define the identity or, better still, the identities of 
natural philosophy, also suggests the need to fully define the identities of other early 
modern intellectual practices. As Baldini and Spruit have noted, natural philosophy 
does not exhaust the range of early modern activities that touched in some manner 
upon the natural world.59
In pre-modern Europe there clearly existed a constellation of disciplines and 
activities that were concerned with discussing the structure, causes, and purpose of 
the created order. In medieval and early modern Europe this was primarily carried 
out through the practice of various forms of philosophy, most obviously through the 
interpretation of various canonical texts written by Aristotle, Ptolemy, Euclid and 
Archimedes along with a series of medieval commentaries. Nevertheless, from the 
mid-fifteenth century anti-Aristotelian philosophers were seeking to expand the range 
of acceptable texts and traditions to include Neoplatonic texts, as well as various 
magical, astrological and divinatory writings. There were also a range of arts and 
activities that sought to extract utility and benefit from knowledge of nature. It is 
simply more straightforward to accept the existence of this broad range of activities, 
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which was practised and valued by many contemporaries and vigorously opposed 
and contested by others, than to question which of these activities either was, or even 
contained ‘modern science’. By taking each of these activities ‘seriously’ it will be 
possible to investigate each of them on their own terms, without even necessarily 
concerning ourselves with whether or not they constituted a unified activity that we 
could describe as ‘early modern science’. Indeed approaching the subject matter in 
this way would allow us to problematize, and question the very concept of ‘early 
modern science’.
This approach also offers the basis to pose new questions about the Church’s role 
in the history of early modern science. We could begin to enquire of its impact in 
particular areas of activity, such as prosecutions for the propounding of philosophical 
ideas, or the number of individuals prosecuted for practising alchemy. This would 
form the basis for considering wider questions about the Church’s role in large-scale 
transformations in early modern knowledge-making practices. For example, we 
may wish to consider the Church’s influence on the redrawing of relations between 
magic and natural philosophy, or to question its role in the separation of alchemy 
and chemistry into two distinct spheres of activity.60 These changes were wrought 
by the actions of individuals and groups including both the Church as an institu-
tion, its various constituent institutions and individual clerics. If we are to consider 
effectively the reasons why such complex re-arrangements within and between early 
modern disciplines and arts occurred, it is essential to reconstruct the multiple, and 
often conflicting, ways in which contemporaries understood them. If we are to factor 
censorship into our analysis of these changes, we must determine how the censors 
regarded these disciplines and arts, and the effectiveness of any actions they under-
took as a consequence.
CONCLUSION
Discussion of the influence that the Catholic Church’s censorial regime exerted upon 
the development and practice of science within Italy has been shaped by a number of 
assumptions formed within, and sustained by several distinct historiographical tradi-
tions. In this article I have sought to identify the most significant of these assumptions, 
and to suggest how alternative historiographical perspectives might be combined in 
order to construct a new framework with which to evaluate the Church’s impact on 
science. This review has also suggested that it is necessary to reframe the questions 
that we ask of the valuable archival materials identified by Baldini and Spruit. For 
much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries discussion of the impact of ecclesi-
astical censorship on science has been framed as a debate over the extent to which 
the Church did or did not hinder the advent of modern science. I have suggested that 
such questions should be substituted for more specific and limited examinations of 
the differing ways in which the Church’s multiple censorial organs acted upon the 
various disciplines and arts that constituted early modern science. Pursuing such a 
programme of research will require the development of new means to analyse the 
various ways in which early moderns thought about and sought to control knowledge 
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making. Such an approach will, I suggest, force us to question the utility of many 
of the categories that have previously been employed both to frame, and to answer 
questions about the Church’s historic attitudes towards science. It will also enable 
us to begin to form new narratives of the emergence of modern science, and of the 
role played by the Church in this process.
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